Distribution of Power and social Utility Under Nonadditive Aggregation Rules

Antoine Billot

Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) from Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne

Keywords: preference; decision making; economic models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 1992-10
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Working Paper: Distribution of Power and social Utility Under Nonadditive Aggregation Rules (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lat:imefth:9203

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