Working Time Regulation in a Search Economy with Worker Moral Hazard

Guillaume Rocheteau

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: This paper analyzes the consequences of a working time reduction within a matching model with worker moral hazard. In the "laissez faire", workers and employers bargain over wages and working hours. When the no-shirking condition (NSC) is binding, the number of working hours is lower than the level that would be negotiated in the case of perfect monitoring and a work-sharing policy increases aggregate employment. At the opposite, for low unemployment countries, the NSC does not bind and a working time regulation always worsens the labour market situation.

Keywords: working time; unemployment; matching; shirking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J22 J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2000-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ind, nep-lab and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Journal of Public Economics, vol. 84 (3), June 2002, pp. 387-425

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Related works:
Journal Article: Working time regulation in a search economy with worker moral hazard (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:00.06

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