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La réélection des Conseillers fédéraux: Sanctions ciblées ou résultats prédéterminés ? Une analyse économétrique des réélections au Conseil fédéral

Hansueli Bacher, Jean-Christian Lambelet () and José Ansón ()

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: The re-elections to the Swiss Federal Government ('Federal Council') have not been much studied so far. On the basis of the 1947-1999 record, we propose an econometric model of these re-elections, consisting of three identities and two equations. Simulating the model, we find that the scores are predetermined - to the tune of about 50% in recent years - by a number of systematic factors on which the candidates have no influence. The simulation residuals can be interpreted as the personal 'sanctions' (negative or positive) inflicted on the candidates by the Federal Chambers on the basis of their policy and personality. The results of some individual re-elections thus appear a good deal less 'brilliant' or 'deplorable' than would appear on first sight. We finally show that the curve of the scores and that of the requisite majorities tend to get closer and could cross before too long.

Keywords: Swiss Federal Government; re-elections; actual and future scores (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2002-05
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Published in Revue suisse d'Economie et de Statistique, vol. 139 (4), décembre 2003

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Journal Article: La réélection des Conseillers fédéraux: Sanctions ciblées ou résultats prédéterminés? Une analyse économétrique des réélections au Conseil fédéral (2003) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:02.09

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