Communicating with a Team of Experts

Dezsoe Szalay and Ramon Arean

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: This paper combines theories of communication with theories of expertise and teams. Facing a team of experts, who must be given incentives to acquire information and to communicate it truthfully, how can and how should the leader communicate with the team members ? We characterize all the possibilities of using the information generated efficiently, and provide a complete welfare ranking of all equilibria. The welfare ranking is shown to depend one for one on the structure of the cost of information acquisition. We discuss applications to task assignment, and to noisy and costly communication.

Keywords: information acquisition; communication; cheap talk; multiple agents; expertise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2005-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ict and nep-knm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:05.12

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