The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness

Bettina Klaus () and Olivier Bochet ()

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) as well as private goods economies. For private goods economies we use a weaker condition than Maskin monotonicity that we call unilateral monotonicity. We introduce two easy-to-check domain conditions which separately guarantee that (i) unilateral/Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness (Theorem 1) and (ii) strategy-proofness implies unilateral/Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 2). We introduce and discuss various classical single-peaked domains and show which of the domain conditions they satisfy (see Propositions 1 and 2 and an overview in Table 1). As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain some extensions of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem as summarized in Theorem 3. We also discuss some new "Muller-Satterthwaite domains" (e.g.,Proposition 3).

Keywords: Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem; restricted domains; rich domains; single-peaked domains; strategy-proofness; unilateral/Maskin monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 40(1), January 2013, pp. 41-63

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Journal Article: The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:10.01

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