Consistency and Population Sensitivity Properties in Marriage and Roommate Markets
Burak Can and
Bettina Klaus ()
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie
Abstract:
We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (2010) introduced two new "population sensitivity" properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents: competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity. On various roommate market domains (marriage markets, no odd rings roommate markets, solvable roommate markets), we characterize the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.
Keywords: consistency; competition and resource sensitivity; core; marriage and roommate markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 41(4), October 2013, pp. 835-862
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Journal Article: Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:10.08
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