Knowledge is power - A theory of information, income, and welfare spending

Jo Lind and Dominic Rohner

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but richer voters are on average best informed. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters. Further, when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.

Keywords: Redistribution; Welfare Spending; Information; Income; Voting; Political Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 D82 H53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pp. + appendix and tables (total 35 pp.)
Date: 2013-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-pol
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http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/13.07.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending (2017)
Working Paper: Knowledge is power: A theory of information, income and welfare spending (2011)
Working Paper: Knowledge is Power - A Theory of Information, Income, and Welfare Spending (2011)
Working Paper: Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income, and Welfare Spending (2011)
Working Paper: Knowledge is power: a theory of information, income, and welfare spending (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:13.07

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