Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment. N.B.: This paper is replaced by Nr 14.05 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result" (August 2014)

Jan Christoph Schlegel

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (Amer. Econ. Rev. 102(1): 594-601, 2012) to show that under the assumption of unilaterally substitutable preferences a matching market with contracts may be embedded into a matching market with salaries. In particular, my result applies to the recently studied problem of cadet-to-branch matching.

Keywords: Matching; Matching with contracts; Matching with salaries; Embedding; Substitutes; Unilateral substitutes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pp.
Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/13.09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:13.09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christina Seld ().