Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets

Bettina Klaus ()

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: For marriage markets with equal numbers of men and women and where all men find all women acceptable and all women find all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterize the core by anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and converse consistency. In a recent paper, Nizamogullari and Özkal-Sanver (2012) generalize this result to the full domain of marriage markets by adding individual rationality and by replacing anonymity with gender fairness. We generalize both results by characterizing the core on the domain of no odd rings roommate markets by individual rationality, anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and converse consistency. We also prove that extending this characterization to the domain of solvable roommate markets is not possible.

Keywords: Converse Consistency; Core; Marriage and Roommate Markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pp.
Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Consistency and its converse for roommate markets (2017)
Working Paper: Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:13.12

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