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Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems

Bettina Klaus () and Jonathan Newton

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: In a dynamic model of assignment problems, small deviations suffice to move between stable outcomes. This result is used to obtain no-selection and almost-no-selection results under the stochastic stability concept for uniform and payoff-dependent errors. There is no-selection of partner or payoff under uniform errors, nor for agents with multiple optimal partners under payoff-dependent errors. There can be selection of payoff for agents with a unique optimal partner under payoff-dependent errors. However, when every agent has a unique optimal partner, almost-no-selection is obtained.

Keywords: Assignment problem; (core) stability; decentralization; stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pp.
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Stochastic stability in assignment problems (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems (2014) Downloads
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