Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result. N.B.: This paper replaces Nr 13.09 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment", (June 2013)

Jan Christoph Schlegel

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: It is shown that a matching market with contracts may be embedded into a matching market with salaries under weaker assumptions on preferences than substitutability. In particular, the result applies to the recently studied problem of cadet-to-branch matching. As an application of the embedding result, a new class of mechanisms for matching markets with contracts is defined that generalize the firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to the case where firms have unilaterally substitutable preferences.

Keywords: Matching; Matching with contracts; Matching with salaries; Embedding; Substitutes; Unilateral substitutes; Bilateral substitutes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pp.
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/14.05.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:14.05

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christina Seld ().