Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: Characterizing target set correspondences
Bettina Klaus () and
Panos Protopapas
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie
Abstract:
We consider the problem of choosing a set of locations of a public good on the real line R. Similarly to Klaus and Storcken (2002), we ordinally extend the agents' preferences over compact subsets of R, and extend the results of Ching and Thomson (1996), Vohra 1999), and Klaus (2001) to choice correspondences. Specifically, we show that efficiency}and either population-monotonicity or one-sided replacement-dominance characterize the class of target set correspondences on the domains of single-peaked preferences and symmetric single-peaked preferences.
Keywords: single-peaked preferences; population-monotonicity; replacement-dominance; target set correspondences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D78 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pp.
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences (2020) 
Working Paper: Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.13
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