Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices

Bettina Klaus () and Alexandru Nichifor

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Keywords: serial dictatorship; individual reservation prices; strategy-proofness; consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pp. Abstract :We propose a new set of mechanisms, which we call serial dictatorship mechanisms with individual reservation prices for the allocation of homogeneous indivisible objects, e.g.,specialist clinic appointments. We show that a mechanism ' satis es minimal tradability,individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering such that ' is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and . We obtain a second characterization by replacing individual rationality with non-imposition. In both our characterizations r, , and 'are all found simultaneously and endogenously from the properties. Finally, we illustrate how our model, mechanism, and results, capture the normative requirements governing the functioning of some real life markets and the mechanisms that these markets use.
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices (2020)
Working Paper: Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:19.04

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