Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems

Di Feng and Bettina Klaus ()

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: We consider multiple-type housing market problems as introduced by Moulin (1995) and study the relationship between strict strong Nash equilibria and the strict core (two solution concepts that are defined in terms of the absence of weak blocking coalitions). We prove that for lexicographically separable preferences, the set of all strict strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of each preference revelation game that is induced by a strictly core-stable mechanism is a subset of the strict core, but not vice versa, i.e., there are strict core allocations that cannot be implemented in strict strong Nash equilibrium (Theorem 1). This result is extended to a more general set of preference domains that satisfy strict core non-emptiness and a minimal preference domain richness assumption (Theorem 2).

Keywords: multiple-type housing market problems; strict core; strict strong Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pp.
Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-ure
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Journal Article: Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.10

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