A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets

Di Feng, Bettina Klaus () and Flip Klijn

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model of trading indivisible objects (houses) (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the coordinate-wise top-trading-cycles (cTTC) mechanism. We first show that on the subdomain of lexicographic preferences, a mechanism is unanimous (or onto), individually rational, strategy-proof, and non-bossy if and only if it is the cTTC mechanism (Theorem 1). Second, using Theorem 1, we obtain a corresponding characterization on the domain of separable preferences (Theorem 2). Finally, we show that on the domain of strict preferences, there is no mechanism satisfying unanimity (or ontoness), individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness (Theorem 3).Our characterization of the cTTC mechanism constitutes the first characterization of an extension of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism to multiple-type housing markets.

Keywords: : multiple-type housing markets; strategy-proofness; non-bossiness; top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism; market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pp.
Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-ore and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.unil.ch/de/files/live/sites/de/files/working-papers/22.06.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:22.06

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christina Seld ().