Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains

Andreas Irmen

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: The design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization. Hence, it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices. A precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players'expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one's own favor (Schelling (1960)). How these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey.

Keywords: vertical restraints; vertical separation; contract theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L22 L42 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 1996-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 12 (4), September 1998, pp. 333-359

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:9617

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christina Seld ().