Die Katastrophen-Versicherung in Spanien

Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: This paper studies the state building insurance monopoly in Spain, the Consorcio the Compensacion de Seguros. It is shown that, just like its Swiss counterparts, the Consorcio operates with exceptionally low transactions costs. Furthermore it allows the supply of a very low cost insurance cover in a domain, where competition would usually lead to market failure due to problems of adverse selection. The existence of the Consorcio is in contradiction with the 3rd EU guidelines on the insurance market, however Spain managed to get an exemption.

Keywords: catastrophe insurance; state monopoly; adverse selection; Spain; EU-legislation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K23 L42 L91 L99 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1997-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Gebäudeversicherung in Europa - Die Grenzen des Wettbewerbs, Haupt Verlag, 2002, pp. 63-86

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:9716

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