Union Power and Product Market Competition: Evidence from the Airline Industry
Damien Neven,
Lars-Hendrik Röller and
Zhentang Zhang
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie
Abstract:
In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which links product market competition and union power. The model has a two-stage setting in which wages are determined through bargaining between management and unions in the first stage, with a price-setting market game to follow in the second stage. Using data for eight European airlines from 1976-1994, we provide evidence on price-cost margins and the measurement of market power in a model of rent sharing. In particular, we find that the welfare effects of rent sharing work mainly through reducing firms' profits, rather than consumers surplus. As a consequence the static impact of unions is more on equity rather than efficiency.
Keywords: efficiency; union power; market power; rent sharing; airline industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L40 L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1998-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/9810.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Union Power and Product Market Competition: Evidence from the Airline Industry (1999) 
Working Paper: Union Power and Product Market Competition: Evidence from the Airline Industry (1998) 
Working Paper: Union Power and Product Market Competition: Evidence from the Airline Industry (1997) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:9810
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