Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: theory and evidence

Pierre Cahuc, Fabien Postel-Vinay and Jean-Marc Robin

Research Unit Working Papers from Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA

Keywords: search frictions; structural estimation; wage bargaining; labor market competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 63 pages
Date: 2003-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
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http://www.inra.fr/Internet/Departements/ESR/UR/lea/documents/wp/wp0212.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence (2006)
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence (2006)
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence (2006)
Working Paper: Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: theory and evidence (2006)
Working Paper: Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: theory and evidence (2006)
Working Paper: Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: Theory and evidence (2006)
Working Paper: Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: theory and evidence (2006)
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining with On-The-Job Search: Theory and Evidence (2003)
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