Government Ownership of Banks, Institutions, and Financial Development
Svetlana Andrianova (),
Panicos Demetriades () and
Anja Shortland ()
No 02/13, Discussion Papers in Economics from Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester
Using a suitably modified locational model of banking, we examine the influence of institutions, such as deposit contract enforcement, in explaining the share of government owned banks in the banking system. We present cross-country evidence suggesting that institutional factors are relatively more important determinants of the share of state banks than political or historical ones. We argue that rather than privatizing or subsidizing state banks governments in developing countries should build institutions that foster the development of private banking.
Keywords: Regulation; opportunistic banks; institutional quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G21 G28 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-11, Revised 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-mfd and nep-pke
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Journal Article: Government ownership of banks, institutions, and financial development (2008)
Working Paper: Government Ownership of Banks, Institutions, and Financial Development (2006)
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