Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

André Barreira da Silva Rocha (), Annick Laruelle () and Peio Zuazo

No 11/54, Discussion Papers in Economics from Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester

Abstract: We generalise and extend the work of Inarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogeneous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version with complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

Date: 2012-01
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