Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population

André Barreira da Silva Rocha (andre-rocha@puc-rio.br) and Annick Laruelle (annick.laruelle@ehu.es)

No 12/12, Discussion Papers in Economics from Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester

Abstract: Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

Keywords: Cooperation; Snowdrift Game; Replicator Dynamics; Evolution; Similarity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05, Revised 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem and nep-evo
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