Reordering an existing queue

Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami

No 13/15, Discussion Papers in Economics from Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester

Abstract: We investigate the problem of reordering agents starting from an existing queue. First, we introduce four important axioms of the problem, budget balance (BB), outcome efficiency (OE), strategyproofness (SP), and individual rationality (IR). Unfortunately, it is easy to show that these four axioms are incompatible in the current setup. Given this negative result, we examine the consequences of relaxing BB, OE and SP, one at a time. Our results are as follows: (i) There is no mechanism satisfying OE, SP and IR which runs a nonnegative surplus at all profiles. (ii) When there are two agents, the only non-trivial mechanisms satisfying BB, SP and IR are Fixed price trading mechanisms but there are additional mechanisms when there are more than two agents. We identify an intuitive mechanism which we call the median price exchange mechanism and characterize its maximal level of inefficiency. (iii) By weakening SP to `one-sided' strategyproofness, we identify two mechanisms, the buyers' mechanism and the sellers' mech- anism, and characterize them on the basis of independence axioms.

Keywords: Queueing problem with an initial order; budget balance; outcome efficiency; strateyproofness; individual rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-tre
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp13-15.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Reordering an existing queue (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lec:leecon:13/15

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://www2.le.ac.u ... -1/discussion-papers

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers in Economics from Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester School of Business, University of Leicester, University Road. Leicester. LE1 7RH. UK Provider-Homepage: https://le.ac.uk/school-of-business. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Abbie Sleath ().