Why are Reforms incomplete? Reputation versus the "need for enemies"

Maxime Menuet and Patrick Villieu

No 2090, LEO Working Papers / DR LEO from Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans

Keywords: Public Debt; Public Choice; Non-cooperative games; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why are Reforms incomplete? Reputation versus the " need for enemies " (2016)
Working Paper: WHY ARE REFORMS INCOMPLETE? REPUTATION VERSUS THE " NEED FOR ENEMIES " (2015)
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