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Why are Reforms incomplete? Reputation versus the "need for enemies"

Maxime Menuet () and Patrick Villieu ()

No 2090, LEO Working Papers / DR LEO from Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans

Keywords: Public Debt; Public Choice; Non-cooperative games; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why are Reforms incomplete? Reputation versus the " need for enemies " (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: WHY ARE REFORMS INCOMPLETE? REPUTATION VERSUS THE " NEED FOR ENEMIES " (2015) Downloads
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