Does public debt secure social peace? A diversionary theory of public debt management

Maxime Menuet, Patrick Villieu and Marcel Voia

No 2822, LEO Working Papers / DR LEO from Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans

Keywords: Public debt; Election; Conflict; Rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Does public debt secure social peace? A diversionary theory of public debt management (2021)
Working Paper: Does public debt secure social peace? A diversionary theory of public debt management (2021)
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