EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals

Giuseppe Attanasi (), Aurora García-Gallego (), Nikolaos Georgantzís () and Aldo Montesano ()

No 11.23.357, LERNA Working Papers from LERNA, University of Toulouse

Abstract: We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the others’ type.

Keywords: Prisoner’s Dilemma; Bargaining; Confirmed Proposals; Confirmed Agreement; Tacit Communication. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www2.toulouse.inra.fr/lerna/travaux/cahiers2011/11.23.357.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ler:wpaper:25432

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LERNA Working Papers from LERNA, University of Toulouse Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Maxime MARTY ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2020-10-08
Handle: RePEc:ler:wpaper:25432