An Experiment on Prisonerâ€™s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals
Giuseppe Attanasi (),
Aurora García-Gallego (),
Nikolaos Georgantzís () and
Aldo Montesano ()
No 11.23.357, LERNA Working Papers from LERNA, University of Toulouse
We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisonerâ€™s Dilemma game. We interpret playersâ€™ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on playersâ€™ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the othersâ€™ type.
Keywords: Prisonerâ€™s Dilemma; Bargaining; Confirmed Proposals; Confirmed Agreement; Tacit Communication. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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