Homo Moralis-Preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching
Ingela Alger () and
No 12.17.374, LERNA Working Papers from LERNA, University of Toulouse
What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by their success in terms of resulting payoffs? We show that when individualsâ€™ preferences are their private information, a convex combinations of selfishness and morality stand out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her material payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what would be â€œthe right thing to do,â€ in terms of material payoffs, if all others would do likewise. We show that the stable degree of morality - the weight placed on the moral goal - equals the index of assortativity in the matching process. The motivation of homo moralis is arguably compatible with how people often reason, and the induced behavior agrees with pro-social behaviors observed in many laboratory experiments.
JEL-codes: C73 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching (2013)
Working Paper: Homo Moralis: Preference Evolution under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching (2012)
Working Paper: Homo Moralis-Preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching (2012)
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