Lessons from an Unconventional Central Banker
Thorvald Moe ()
Economics One-Pager Archive from Levy Economics Institute
The global financial crisis has generated renewed interest in the 1951 Treasury - Federal Reserve Accord and its lessons for central bank independence. A broader interpretation of the Accord and of Marriner S. Eccles's role at the Federal Reserve should teach central bankers that independence can be crucial for fighting inflation, but also encourage them to be more supportive of government efforts to fight deflation and mass unemployment.
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