Insider Power and Wage Determination in Bulgaria An Econometric Investigation

Sabien Dobbelaere

LICOS Discussion Papers from LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven

Abstract: Using a unique 3-digit firm level data set of all medium and large sized manufacturing enterprises in Bulgaria covering the years 1997/1998, we investigate how wage determination is related to ownership status. Building on a slightly modified version of the Right-To-Manage Model, our pooled OLS, panel and first-differences TSLS estimates show statistically significant differences in the share of rents taken by workers employed in state, private domestic and foreign firms. Taking account of firm heterogeneity, we find that rent sharing is nearly non-existent in foreign-owned firms while the level of pay is higher compared to state-owned companies. Further, rent sharing seems to be highly pronounced in state-owned enterprises while on average domestically private-owned companies are characterised by less rent sharing. Overall, our robustness checks confirm these findings.

Keywords: Bulgarian Labour Market; Enterprise Behaviour; Insider Effects; Panel Data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D21 J30 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2001
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mfd and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Insider power and wage determination in Bulgaria: an econometric investigation (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lic:licosd:11101

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