Trade, Development, and the Political Economy of Public Standards

Johan Swinnen and Thijs Vandemoortele ()

LICOS Discussion Papers from LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven

Abstract: This paper presents a political economy model of public standards in an open economy model. We use the model to derive the political optimum and to analyze different factors that have an influence on this political equilibrium. The paper discusses how the level of development influences the political equilibrium. We also analyze the relation between trade and the political equilibrium and compare this political outcome with the social optimum to identify under which cases `under-standardization?or `over-standardization?results, and which standards can be labeled as (producer)protectionist measures.

Keywords: standards; political economy; trade; development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F59 H49 L15 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/licos/publications/dp/dp236.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Trade, Development, and the Political Economy of Public Standards (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lic:licosd:23609

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