Why does the WTO have an Antidumping Agreement?
James C. Hartigan and
Hylke Vandenbussche
LICOS Discussion Papers from LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven
Abstract:
This paper develops a model that offers a plausible interpretation for the empirical observation of diffusion of antidumping (AD) laws amongst WTO members. Contrary to the regnant belief that this proliferation is driven mainly by retaliatory motives, our model shows that adoption and use of AD laws involve a cooperative act amongst WTO members in an infinite horizon game. The diffusion of AD laws need not result in a Prisonner.s dilemma. Instead we show that the AD agreement of the WTO can serve as a risk-sharing vehicle amongst WTO members in response to adverse shocks incurred by domestic producers.
Keywords: Antidumping; non-cooperative games; WTO; proliferation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F11 F14 F16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lic:licosd:25310
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