Exclusive Data, Price Manipulation and Market Leadership
Leonardo Madio () and
Carlo Reggiani ()
No 202102, Working Papers from University of Liverpool, Department of Economics
The unprecedented access of firms to consumer level data not only facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing but also alters firms’ strategic incentives. We show that exclusive access to a list of consumers can provide incentives for a firm to endogenously assume the price leader’s role, and so to strategically manipulate its rival’s price. Prices and profits are non-monotonic in the length of the consumer list. For an intermediate size, price leadership entails an equilibrium outcome characterised by supra-competitive prices and low consumer surplus. In contrast, for short or long lists of consumers, exclusive data availability intensifies market competition.
Keywords: Exclusive data; Personalised pricing; Price leadership; Strategic price manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K21 L11 L13 L41 L86 M21 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/schoolof ... arket,Leadership.pdf First version, 2021 (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Exclusive Data, Price Manipulation and Market Leadership (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:liv:livedp:202102
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Liverpool, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Rachel Slater ().