Bailouts in Federations

Karolina Kaiser

Munich Dissertations in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This dissertation deals with the topic of bailouts in federations. Institutions and instruments helping to alleviate the incentive problems arising from bailouts are analyzed. In particular, the role of the timing of elections, bailout restrictions and the exploitation of budgetary information from comparable jurisdictions is considered.

Keywords: Federations; Bailouts; Commitment Problem; Timing of Elections; Budgetary Crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-27
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:dissen:11212

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