Political Institutions and Incentives for Economic Reforms

Kira Astrid Börner

Munich Dissertations in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Political institutions matter for the incentives of politicians to implement economic reforms. This dissertation presents tools of analysis for understanding how political institutions constrain and shape the incentives of political decision-makers. Thus, it identifies reasons for why current governments might not enact sufficiently large economic reforms, delay necessary reforms, or take the wrong reform steps, as they are commonly perceived to do. In particular, the dissertation analyzes the incentives to privatize state-owned enterprises, to enact reforms in the presence of influential interest gropus, and to implement anti-corruption measures.

Keywords: political economy; political institutions; privatization; interest groups; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01-26
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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