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Fighting Multiple Tax Havens

May Elsayyad and Kai Konrad

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a competition theory framework that evaluates an important aspect of the OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices Initiative against tax havens. We show that the sequential nature of the process is harmful and more costly than a “big bang” multilateral agreement. The sequentiality may even prevent the process from being completed successfully. Closing down a subset of tax havens reduces competition among the havens that remain active. This makes their “tax haven business” more profitable and shifts a larger share of rents to these remaining tax havens, making them more reluctant to give up their “tax haven business”. Moreover, the outcome of this process, reducing the number of tax havens, but not eliminating them altogether, may reduce welfare in the OECD.

Keywords: tax haven; harmful tax practices; bidding for haven inactivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

Published in Journal of International Economics 2 86(2012): pp. 295-305

Downloads: (external link)
https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13964/1/SSRN-id1688250.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fighting multiple tax havens (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Fighting Multiple Tax Havens (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Fighting Multiple Tax Havens (2010) Downloads
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