Transitions in the negotiations on climate change

Karen Pittel and Dirk Rübbelke

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Frequently, international environmental negotiations have been analyzed in two-agent (2 × 2) games. Yet, in order to involve additional strategies, (3 × 3) games gained attention recently. We employ such a (3 × 3) game setting in order to depict international negotiations on climate change and integrate both the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken games in this setting. We analyze transitions of negotiation states and describe how ancillary benefits and first-mover advantages influence agents’ behavior in the negotiations, when three different strategies or levels of climate protection efforts are available. Finally, we also integrate strategies to mitigate and to adapt to climate change into the analysis in the (3 × 3) game setting.

Keywords: 2-Person games; Adaptation; Ancillary benefits; Climate change; First-mover advantage; International negotiations; Chicken game; Prisoner’s dilemma game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 1 12(2012-03): pp. 23-39

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:19343

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