Intragenerational externalities and intergenerational transfers

Martin Kolmar and Volker Meier

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: In an environment with asymmetric information and intragenerational externalities, the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves- Vickrey mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can be covered in every generation only if the initial allocation is not dynamically efficient. While introducing a pay-as-you-go scheme without addressing the externality already yields a Pareto improvement, further welfare gains can be captured by using the additional resources to achieve a perfect internalization.

Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 4 11(2012): pp. 531-548

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Intragenerational externalities and intergenerational transfers (2012)
Working Paper: Intra-Generational Externalities and Inter-Generational Transfers (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:19480

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics Ludwigstr. 28, 80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tamilla Benkelberg ().