Hooliganism and police tactics
Panu Poutvaara () and
Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics
In this paper, we introduce a model of hooliganism to study how different types of policing can be expected to affect violence and the number of hooligans in violent supporter clubs. Hooligans differ in their preferred level of fighting, and obtain utility also from social identity that belonging to a supporter club gives. We find that an increase in discriminative policing, like intelligence units, always reduces violence. Indiscriminate policing, such as the use of teargas or random jailing of potential law breakers, may, however, backfire and result in smaller and more brutal groups.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory 3 11(2009): pp. 441-453
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Journal Article: Hooliganism and Police Tactics (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:19792
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics Ludwigstr. 28, 80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tamilla Benkelberg ().