Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: The bargaining family under scrutiny

Helmut Rainer

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a repeated family bargaining model that links the topics of employment and households. A key aspect of the model is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously. We show that: (1) the efficiency of household decisions is sometimes inversely related to the prevailing degree of gender discrimination in labor markets; (2) women who are discriminated against have difficulty enforcing cooperative household outcomes because they may be extremely limited to credibly punish opportunistic behavior by their male partners; (3) the likelihood that sharing rules such as \"equal sharing\" are maintained throughout a marriage relationship is highest when men and women face equal opportunities in labor markets.

Date: 2008
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Published in Journal of Population Economics 2 21(2008): pp. 305-329

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Related works:
Journal Article: Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: the bargaining family under scrutiny (2008)
Working Paper: Gender Discrimination and Efficiency in Marriage: the Bargaining Family under Scrutiny (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:19817

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