When trustors compete for the favour of a trustee - A laboratory experiment

Stefan Bauernschuster, Oliver Falck and Niels Daniel Große

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We experimentally compare standard two-player trust games to three-player trust games, where two trustors compete for one trustee. We argue that a competitive environment could affect how the trustors’ behaviour is perceived by the trustee. If two trustors compete for the favour of a trustee, the trustee might find it difficult to interpret the trustors’ investments as kind since they could as well be the outcome of a competitive race; this could negatively affect the trustee’s returned amount. We allow for heterogeneous effects of competition for strangers and artificially induced partners. The results of our one-shot trust games show that introducing competition among trustors reduces return ratios of the trustee. We do not find any evidence for statistically different effects of competition for partners and strangers.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Journal of Economic Psychology 34(2013): pp. 133-147

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: When trustors compete for the favour of a trustee – A laboratory experiment (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:20115

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics Ludwigstr. 28, 80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tamilla Benkelberg ().