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Tax competition in a simple model with heterogeneous firms: How larger markets reduce profit Taxes

Andreas Haufler and Frank Stähler

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We set up a simple two-country model of tax competition where firms with different productivity decide in which location to produce and sell output. In this model, a unique, asymmetric Nash equilibrium is shown to exist, provided that countries are sufficiently different with respect to their exogenous market size. Sorting of firms occurs in equilibrium, as the smaller country levies the lower tax rate and attracts the low-cost firms. A simultaneous expansion of both markets that raises the profitability of firms intensifies tax competition and causes both countries to reduce their tax rates, despite higher corporate tax bases.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (53)

Published in International Economic Review 2 54(2013): pp. 665-692

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Related works:
Journal Article: TAX COMPETITION IN A SIMPLE MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS: HOW LARGER MARKETS REDUCE PROFIT TAXES (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax competition in a simple model with heterogeneous firms: How larger markets reduce profit taxes (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax Competition in a Simple Model with Heterogeneous Firms: How Larger Markets Reduce Profit Taxes (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Tax competition in a simple model with heterogeneous firms: How larger markets reduce profit taxes (2009) Downloads
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