Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises

Henrik Enderlein, Christoph Trebesch and Laura von Daniels

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper measures \" debt disputes\" between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research.

Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Published in Journal of International Money and Finance 2 31(2012): pp. 250-266

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