Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information

Kai Konrad and Marcel Thum

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyse bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Incomplete information is known as one of the key reasons why negotiations may fail more generally, and why efficiency gains cannot be exploited. We ask whether unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces or increases the likelihood for an efficient negotiation outcome. We find that such commitment behaviour reduces the gains from global cooperation and that, in turn, this reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements. © 2014 The London School of Economics and Political Science.

Keywords: bargaining; environmental management; environmental policy; international agreement; probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published in Economica 322 81(2014): pp. 244-256

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:22062

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics Ludwigstr. 28, 80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tamilla Benkelberg ().