Love and taxes - and matching institutions

Kai Konrad and Kjell Lommerud ()

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Income disparities and the intra-family redistribution implied by a marriage may induce a high-income earner to abstain from marrying a low-income earner even though they would be a perfect match emotionally. Redistributive income taxation eases this problem, and the design of marriage matching institutions interacts with this role of redistributive taxation. Matching institutions that ensure that people largely from the same income groups meet each other can substitute for redistribution. Matching across income groups that focuses on emotional quality or preference congruence of the match may increase the efficiency-enhancing role of taxation. © Canadian Economics Association.

Keywords: family structure; household income; income distribution; marriage; preference behavior; tax system; wage gap (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Canadian Journal of Economics 3 43(2010): pp. 919-940

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Related works:
Journal Article: Love and taxes - and matching institutions (2010)
Working Paper: Love and Taxes - and Matching Institutions (2008)
Working Paper: Love and taxes - and matching institutions (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:22079

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