Diverse and just? The role of quota-based selection policies on organizational outcomes
Brooke Shaughnessy,
Susanne Braun,
Tanja Hentschel and
Claudia V. Peus
Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Quota-based selection systems are viewed as a way to overcome biases;however, they may produce negative effects on the individuals as well as on the organizations that enact said procedures. To date, the processes underlying these negative effects have been relatively neglected in the literature and thus warrant further investigation. The current paper specifically seeks to address the process through which quota-based selection policies influence applicant evaluations of the organization and ultimately their decision to pursue employment. We demonstrate that quota-based selection policies negatively impact procedural justice perceptions, which in turn influenced perceptions of anticipated organizational support, organizational prestige, and organizational attractiveness. Ultimately, these organizational evaluations worked together to predict job pursuit intentions. The findings suggest that organizations need to carefully consider how they present their selection policies to applicant pools as they may harm organizational attractiveness and job pursuit intentions. The present study comes at a timely point in the discussion and implementation of quotas in Europe, and specifically in Germany, and provides some initial insights into how organizations are likely to be affected by such policies.
Date: 2016
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Published in European Journal of Social Psychology 7 46(2016): pp. 880-890
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:43467
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