The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy

Sascha Becker, Katrin Boeckh, Christa Hainz and Ludger Wößmann
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ludger Woessmann

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We hypothesise that the Habsburg Empire with its well-respected administration increased citizens' trust in local public services. In several Eastern European countries, communities on both sides of the long-gone Habsburg border have shared common formal institutions for a century now. We use a border specification and a two-dimensional geographic regression discontinuity design to identify from individuals living within a restricted band around the former border. We find that historical Habsburg affiliation increases current trust and reduces corruption in courts and police. Falsification tests of spuriously moved borders, geographic and pre-existing differences and interpersonal trust corroborate a genuine Habsburg effect.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (204)

Published in Economic Journal 590 126(2016): pp. 40-74

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long‐Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2016)
Working Paper: The Empire is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2011)
Working Paper: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2011)
Working Paper: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2011)
Working Paper: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2011)
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