Electoral cycles in MPs' salaries: evidence from the German states

Björn Kauder, Manuela Krause and Niklas Potrafke
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Manuela Kauder

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Members of parliament (MPs) often set their own salaries. Voters dislike self-serving politicians, and politicians are keen to please voters. In line with political business cycle theories, politicians thus may delay giving themselves a salary increase until after elections. We investigate electoral cycles in the salary increases of German state MPs. Using data for 15 states over the period 1980-2014, we find no evidence that increases in MP salaries are influenced by election cycles. Politicians can increase their salaries at any point during the legislative period without negative consequences. We posit that this may be because even those voters who are most disenchanted with politics likely understand that all politicians benefit from a salary increase and thus do not punish the governing party at the polls.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in International Tax and Public Finance 4 25(2018): pp. 981-1000

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Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral cycles in MPs’ salaries: evidence from the German states (2018)
Working Paper: Electoral Cycles in MPs' Salaries: Evidence from the German States (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:62849

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