Do direct elections matter? Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany

Stefanie Gaebler and Felix Roesel
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Stefanie Gäbler

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We estimate the causal effect of direct elections on the economic performance of politicians. Candidates running in direct elections to head local governments in the German state of Brandenburg need an absolute majority, and votes for the winner must represent at least 15% of eligible voters. If the quorum is not reached, direct elections are suspended, and local councils appoint the head of government. We examine election outcomes around the quorum, where the form of government is arguably exogenous. Event study results show that the public employment service becomes somewhat more effective under directly elected politicians. However, directly elected politicians do not seem to attract more businesses or expedite administrative acts.

Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in International Tax and Public Finance 6 26(2019): pp. 1416-1445

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