On the Positive Effects of Overcon fident Self-Perception in Teams
Philipp Wichardt and
Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics
In this paper, we study the individual payoff effects of overconfident self-perception in teams. In particular, we demonstrate that the welfare of an overconfident agent in a team of one rational and one overconfident agent or a team of two overconfident agents can be higher than that of the members of a team of two rational agents. This result holds irrespective of the assumption about the agents' awareness of their colleague's bias. Moreover, we show that an overcondent agent is always better of when he is unaware of a potential bias of his colleague.
Keywords: Overconfidence; Team Production (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D62 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-neu
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:12246
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