Searching the eBay Marketplace

Katharina Sailer ()

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper proposes a framework for demand estimation with data on bids, bidders' identities, and auction covariates from a sequence of eBay auctions. First the aspect of bidding in a marketplace environment is developed. Form the simple dynamic auction model with IPV and private bidding costs it follows that if participation is optimal the bidder searches with a "reservation bid" for low-price auctions. Extending results from the empirical auction literature and employing a similar two-stage procedure as has recently been used when estimating dynamic games it is shown that bidding costs are non-parametrically identified. The procedure is tried on a new data set. The median cost is estimated at less than 2% of transaction prices.

Keywords: search models; auctions; eBay; Internet auctions; econometrics of auctions; bidding costs; identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 C51 D44 D82 D83 L10 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Searching the eBay Marketplace (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:1234

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